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The article deals with the issue on kinds of negligent guilt differentiation: levity and negligence which 
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suggested that the definition of levity in the law text should be improved.
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According to article 9 of the RSFSR Criminal 
Code, the crime recognised to be committed 
by negligence if a person committed it foresaw 
possibility of socially dangerous consequences 
of this action or omission occurrence, but 
thoughtlessly counted on their prevention or 
did not foresee possibility of such consequences 
occurrence though should and could have 
foreseen them. The criminal code of the RSFSR 
at a legislative level did not separate out and did 
not formulate kinds of negligent guilt. Concepts 
of criminal self-confidence and a criminal 
negligence as kinds of negligent guilt existed 
only in a criminal law science.
Scientific research in the field of the doctrine 
about guilt, judiciary practice has allowed to 
specify the content of negligent guilt kinds and to 
formulate them in article 26 of the Criminal code, 
1996. Criminal self-confidence thus reasonably 
has been renamed into levity. Fixing independent 
kinds of careless guilt in the law logically 
assumes their existence in reality, establishment 
and definition of corresponding criminally-legal 
meaning in every separate case.
The problem put in the given article heading 
was a subject of special researches neither in 
educational, nor in the scientific literature on 
criminal law. Its decision has not been claimed 
by judiciary practice either. This is explained 
by the fact that the criminal law does not 
differentiate responsibility depending on kind of 
negligent guilt. For investigation agencies it not 
so important: whether a crime is committed by 
levity or by negligence. The main issue for them 
is: whether the committed crime was intentional 
or negligent as its qualification and all criminally-
legal consequences following from them depend 
on it. A fundamental issue both in science 
and in practice of criminal law application is 
accepted to consider differentiation of direct 
and indirect intention as certain criminally-legal 
consequences (responsibility for an unfinished 
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crime, for complicity in a crime and a number of 
others) are also connected with it.
Based on the analysis of legislative formulas 
of these kinds of guilt this distinction is deemed 
to be simple enough: at levity the subject foresees 
possibility of socially dangerous consequences 
of the act occurrence, but at negligence such 
foreseeing is missing. At definition of a kind of 
negligent guilt in judicial-investigatory practice 
this distinction does not represent special 
complexity in some cases either. We will analyze 
two situations. In the first case driver М. knowing 
about malfunction of brakes of the car had drove 
out on a haul but, having appeared in the conditions 
of emergency braking, committed a road accident 
entailing a person's death. In the course of 
investigation it was established, that М. had a 
long term of work experience before committing 
that road accident he drove out by a faulty car 
several times and everything went safely. He was 
going to eliminate malfunction of the brakes in 
the coming days off. М realised the fact of the 
Traffic Regulations violation by him, foresaw 
possibility of socially dangerous consequences 
occurrence but, having wide experience, counted 
on prevention of consequences. His reckoning 
in this case appeared erroneous, self-confident. 
We believe that in this case any investigator will 
ascertain guilt in the form of levity, and it will be 
correct.
In another case А. walked a dog out without 
a muzzle and let it off a lead. In a house court 
yard there was a drunken passer-by with a stick 
in his hands. When the dog ran by him, that 
drunken man waved a stick at it. The dog went for 
him and caused serious mutilation. In this case 
the master of the dog has demonstrated evident 
criminal negligence signs. Proceeding from it, it 
is possible to draw a conclusion that the trespass 
to this passer-by became a result of concurrence 
of variety of circumstances which the master 
of the dog did not foresee. At the same time in 
both above-stated cases the subjects (driver М. 
and the master of the dog А.) realised the fact of 
precaution rules violation. In this connection the 
question arises: why the driver М's guilt is in the 
form of levity and the dog’s master А's is in the 
form of negligence?
Psychological and legal grounds of criminal 
liability for levity and negligence are common: 
violation of those or other rules of precaution 
takes place in both cases. In most cases the 
subject realises the fact of their violation. At 
levity it always happens, that it predetermines 
the subject's foreseeing of possibility of socially 
dangerous consequences occurrence and 
reckoning on their prevention. In this connection 
we believe, that realisation of precaution rules 
violation at levity should be included in the 
legislative definition of this kind of negligent 
guilt. The legislative formula of levity should 
be expressed as follows: « Crime is recognised 
to be committed by levity if the person realised 
precaution rules violation by it, foresaw possibility 
of socially dangerous consequences of the actions 
(omission) occurrence, but counted on prevention 
of these consequences in a self-confident way 
without sufficient bases for that».
However, recognition of the fact of 
precaution rules violation at negligent guilt does 
not always take place. At criminal negligence it 
is possible to separate out its two variations that 
did not use to be the subject of criminal science 
attention. In the first case the person, despite 
recognition of precaution rules violation by him, 
for all that does not foresee socially dangerous 
consequences occurrence. The above-stated 
situation with a dog and the passer-by can be 
an example of such negligence variation. The 
master of the dog, walking it without a muzzle 
and without a lead, fully realized that he breaks 
walking of dogs rules. Nevertheless, he did 
not foresee real consequences to occur to the 
force of, as it was noted above, concurrence of 
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variety of occasional circumstances. However, 
he should and could have foreseen them. That 
is, objective and subjective criteria of negligence 
take place in this case. The walking dogs rules 
are meant, including occasional concurrence 
of circumstances as well. It is possible to give 
other examples of criminal negligence when the 
subject though realised precaution rules violation 
by him, but did not foresee socially dangerous 
consequences occurrence.
Another variation of negligence is cases 
where the person does not realise precaution rules 
violation by him and does not foresee, in this 
connection, socially dangerous consequences 
occurrence. Such variation of negligence is 
inherent to so-called, «tort of omission». Such 
«torts» are cases of trespass by omission with 
guilt only in guilt of negligence where the 
person did not realise precaution rules violation 
by him. The psychological reasons for «torts 
of omission» are carelessness, forgetfulness, 
absent-mindedness. In ‘torts of omission» the 
subject switches his attention from a duty on 
consequences prevention to more important 
requirements for him at that moment. As a matter 
of fact, the subject neglects his duties on harm 
prevention, which stipulates grounds for his 
criminal liability. For example, the driver of the 
car in the course of driving changed a disk in the 
tape recorder, did not notice a speed limitation 
sign, did not undertake any measures to its 
restriction, that resulted in a car accident with 
a criminally-legal meaning. In the given case 
replacement of a disk for the driver was a more 
urgent requirement, rather than control over a 
road situation and safe movement of the car.
In the absence precaution rules violation 
recognition by the person guilt in the form of 
levity is always excluded. So, if in the above-
stated example with driver М. he «has forgotten» 
to check up the car brakes condition his guilt can 
be expressed only in negligence.
The stated allows to draw the following 
conclusion: breaking precaution rules, the subject 
both at levity, and at negligence can realise the 
fact of such violation. In this connection there is 
a main theoretical and practical question: how 
to define, at violation of which rules and in what 
conditions the subject foresees possibility of 
socially dangerous consequences occurrence and 
it will testify to levity and in what -where he does 
not foresee, negligence should be ascertained.
In algorithm of a form and a kind of guilt 
establishment the first thing to define is whether 
the subject did not foresee possibility of socially 
dangerous consequences of his act occurrence. 
If the person foresaw possibility of socially 
dangerous consequences occurrence, then both 
intention (direct or indirect), and negligence 
in the form of levity are possible. If he did not 
foresee such consequences occurrence then it 
can be either negligence, or an innocent trespass. 
Basis of the main link of the specified algorithm 
establishment (foreseeing or not foreseeing 
socially dangerous consequences occurrence) is 
an estimation of investigation agencies and court. 
This estimation should be made with regard for 
all concrete circumstances of a tresspass and 
individual qualities of the subject. Existence of 
estimation procedure in guilt establishment as, 
however, in all other cases of estimating activity 
always assumes ambiguity, presence of alternative 
variants in a final conclusion.
In respect of consideration of the issue 
stated in the article heading, we will give two 
situations and define a kind of guilt in them. 
In the first case P. was walking a big beautiful 
of bull-dog breed dog without a muzzle. The 
child approached them and asked to pat a dog. 
P. allowed. The child while patting the dog 
stepped carelessly on its paw. The dog caught 
unexpectedly at his hand, having caused serious 
mutilation. In the course of investigation P. 
stated, that the dog was very kind, children often 
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tapped it, but similar consequences had never 
occurred. In another offered situation two young 
men K. and V., coming back from a restaurant 
went along a slippery sidewalk, pushing each 
other, putting each other footboards. When К. 
pushed V. another time, the latter moved back, 
stumbled against a border, fell down, hit an 
occipital part against a tree stub and died after 
a while. It is quite obvious, that in both given 
situations the subjects broke corresponding rules 
of behaviour and their guilt is negligent. In the 
case with the dog's master P., the latter broke 
formally established rules of animals walking. 
In the situation with young men household rules 
of precaution were broken. The statement of 
an intention on a trespass matter in both given 
situations does not fit common sense. But how 
can a kind of negligent guilt in the given cases be 
determined? We believe that for this purpose it 
is necessary to start with some rules of negligent 
guilt establishment. For guilt in the form of levity, 
violation of such rules and under such conditions 
which give the direct information on imminent 
danger is characteristic and generates reckoning 
of the person on prevention of consequences. 
Infringement of such rules should be rough 
enough. The tresspass mechanism in such 
cases is rather simple. So, if the person being 
in a condition of strong alcoholic intoxication 
starting driving a car does not cope with it and 
commits a road accident then it is obvious, 
that he inflicted harm by levity. For a criminal 
negligence more difficult mechanism of a 
tresspass and in such conditions which does not 
bear the due information about direct imminent 
danger is typical. In this connection the person 
breaking rules of precaution at this kind of guilt, 
does not foresee possibility of socially dangerous 
consequences occurrence either. As it was 
marked above, the trespass due to negligence in 
many cases arises out of concurrence of variety 
of circumstances.
Proceeding from stated, we believe, that 
in situations where P. allowed the child to pat a 
dog, guilt was in the form of levity. He, being 
the master of the big bull-dog breed dog though 
realised its potential danger, however, proceeding 
from the previous experience reckoned that in 
this very case everything will go safely. But he 
has made a mistake which always takes place at 
levity. P. did not take into account that the child 
would step on the dog’s paw and its reaction to it. 
In situations with young men К. and V. we believe 
that К. has deprived V. of life due to negligence. 
Firstly, the situation of a tresspass did not bear any 
information about obvious direct danger for the 
guilty person secondly the tresspass mechanism 
in this case has a complicated character typical to 
negligence. In the beginning the victim stumbled 
against a border, and then hit exactly an occipital 
part against a tree stub.
Criteria of differentiation of levity and 
negligence are estimating. In many cases it is 
difficult enough to define a kind of negligent 
guilt unequivocally. Even the higher judicial 
instances make mistakes delivering incorrect 
formulations. As an example, it is possible to 
give a G. case which has become a subject of 
consideration of the RSFSR Supreme Court. 
G. took three watchdogs without muzzles from 
nursery against instructions, walked them on a 
foot path and led towards a vegetable storehouse. 
G. let the dogs off the leads, and they ran to a 
scrap metal dump where in two unfit for use 
cabins of agricultural car four juvenile children 
were sitting. Having seen the dogs, Vitya D. and 
Misha B. shouted: «Dogs!» and began to escape. 
The youngest 6-year old Misha B. did not manage 
to escape in time, he was attacked by dogs and 
they inflicted him grievous bodily harm which 
resulted in his death at hospital on the ninth day 
after the accident. According to witness Vitya D.'s 
testimony G. might not have seen him and other 
children as they were sitting inside the cabins 
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of the agricultural car. The judicial board of the 
RSFSR Supreme Court established guilt in the 
form of self-confidence (levity according to the 
Russian Federation Criminal Code) in this case 
and specified that crime committed by G. should 
be qualified under art.106 of the RSFSR Criminal 
Code providing liability for manslaughter1.
Qualification in this case does not raise any 
doubt, however it is deemed, that the Judicial board 
conclusion on definition of the kind of negligent 
guilt as self-confidence (levity) is incorrect. 
Conditions and the tresspass mechanism in this 
case are characteristic for guilt in the form of 
negligence. The given circumstances of the case 
do not give the bases to assert, that G. foresaw 
possibility of a tresspass to children. If he had 
foreseen it, then a question arises: on what did 
he count to prevent harm? The definition of 
the Judicial board on the given case contains 
incorrect statement either: « G. taking dogs 
from nursery without muzzles and letting them 
off leads, should have foreseen (it is marked by 
us. – V.P.), that at such actions of his harmful 
consequences can occur, but he thoughtlessly 
hoped (is marked by us- V.P.) that in this case 
these harmful consequences will not occur». 
Incorrectness of the given statement is obvious. 
Obligation of consequences foreseeing is an 
objective criterion of a criminal negligence, as 
this very kind of negligent guilt is confirmed by 
G. case.
Practical value of an exact establishment of 
a kind of negligent guilt is seen in two aspects: 
firstly, it is correctness, «purity» of a committed 
act qualification that facilitates principle of 
legality observance; secondly, – influence of 
degree of guilt on punishment imposition. 
Guilt degree at levity, with other things being 
equal, is higher, than at negligence. It should 
be reflected in imposition of punishment for 
the committed crime. At guilt in the form of 
levity punishment should be more severe, than 
at negligence that will contribute to principle of 
justice observance.
1 See: Collection of decisions of Presidium and definitions of Judicial board on criminal cases of the Supreme Court of 
RSFSR (1964-1972), M. Legal. liter. 1974. P.277-278. 
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В статье рассматривается вопрос о разграничении видов неосторожной вины: легкомыслия и 
небрежности, которому в науке уголовного права и судебной практике достаточного внимания 
не уделялось. Анализируются конкретные ситуации, и приводится авторское решение по 
определению вида вины в них. Предлагается усовершенствовать определение легкомыслия в 
тексте закона.
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